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¹ 
Embezzlement and similar crimes of financial misconduct are a growing 
area of concern for library managers and trustees. Library budgets have in-
creased dramatically during the past twenty years, but this has not been ac-
companied by a corresponding increase in financial management tech-
niques. This study investigated a national sample of ten states and an in- 
depth case study of one state (Indiana) using the technique of internal con-
trol (a subspecialty of auditing), both to understand how the embezzlements 
occurred and to suggest areas of improvement in library financial manage-
ment to deter future cases of embezzlement. Libraries that experienced em-
bezzlement tend to lack internal practices, a condition that may be common 
to many public libraries. Two general findings emerged from the study: em-
bezzlement is a continuing problem in public libraries, and better training 
in financial management for librarians and library board members should 
increase awareness of the risks of embezzlement and significantly deter em-
bezzlement. 
I. Introduction 
Embezzling from a library? Doesn't that show a lack of ambition? 
(Early reviewer of the research) 
It is tempting to dismiss an investigation of library embezzlement 
with a flip comment. However, there is a long history of embezzlement 
in librarianship. For example, Klas Linderfelt, ALA's president from 
1891 
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to 1892, was forced to resign as both ALA president and director of 
the Milwaukee library after it was discovered that he had embezzled 
over $9,000 from the library during a nine-year period [1]. 
Part of the difficulty in recognizing the risk of embezzlement may 
come from thinking about libraries as small enterprises, from which 
stealing is not worth the effort. An examination of library budget statis-
tics for 1993, however, indicates that the median budget for even a 
small library (serving a population of 10,000-24,999) is over $229,000 
[2], below Wall Street standards but large enough to be tempting. 
A number of library practitioners also appear to have come to the 
conclusion that library assets are large enough to be worth stealing. A 
1987 American Libraries editorial, for example, notes with only slight 
exaggeration the increasing frequency of embezzlement cases reported 
in the library and popular press [3]. More recently, a casual 
reading of the 1994 issues of American Libraries uncovers no fewer 
than eight reports of fraud, theft, or other financial misconduct in 
libraries. This evidence does not necessarily signify that librarians 
are turning to crime en masse, but anecdotal evidence does indicate the 
need to investigate the nature and extent of embezzlement. 
Given these indications that embezzlement may be a problem in 
public libraries, the purpose of this study was twofold: (1) to 
investigate occurrences of embezzlement nationwide to determine if 
embezzlement is a widespread problem and, if so, the general 
conditions under which embezzlement occurs and (2) to examine 
library embezzlement in detail in a representative state, with the goal 
of understanding not only how it occurs but also how to suggest 
improvements in library management that would discourage future 
cases. The study examined a representative sample of states and then 
focused on Indiana as a case study. The analytic framework used in the 
research was internal control, a subdiscipline of auditing that is 
specifically concerned with the protection of organizational financial 
assets. 
II. Methodology 
Defining Embezzlement 
Embezzlement, as a rule, is not distinguished in state criminal law 
as a separate criminal offense. Embezzlement is included with a 
broad range of crimes under the rubric of property-related offenses. 
This includes crimes of financial misconduct, but also larceny, burglary, 
and related property crimes that were not examined in the study. In 
order to operationalize embezzlement and narrow the scope of the 
study to 
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a more precise set of criminal activities, embezzlement was defined with 
criteria devised by D. R. Cressey [4] . 
Cressey abandoned a strictly legal concept of embezzlement, noting 
that the term "did not describe a homogeneous class of criminal behav-
ior" [4, p. 20] . In place of a legal definition, Cressey established two 
criteria for inclusion in a category he termed "criminal violation of 
financial trust." The criteria are that the "person must have accepted 
a position of trust in good faith" and that the person "must have vio-
lated that trust by committing a crime" [4, p. 20]. As he points out, 
the first criterion is nearly synonymous with the legal definition of "fe-
lonious intent," while the second criterion allows the inclusion of indi-
viduals who meet this condition even though they may have been con-
victed of other crimes of financial misconduct such as larceny or 
forgery. This wording allows a consistent definition that included all 
of the prosecuted cases investigated in this research. Cressey and other 
researchers (for example, [5] ), however, use the terms "embezzle-
ment," "fraud," and "financial misconduct" interchangeably. The 
terms are also used interchangeably in this study. 
Sample Selection: National Sample 
The research examined a period from 1983 to 1992. The early 1980s 
mark the beginning of a large volume of literature on financial miscon-
duct. (This may be due, in general, to widespread interest in business 
ethics during the excesses of the Reagan years and the more stringent 
internal reporting standards that were mandated by the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act [6] ). The ten-year period marks the start of the earliest 
case in the 1980s and continues through the latest reported case. 
An initial sample of cases was collected by conducting keyword 
searches for crime and libraries on the following databases: Library and 
Information Science Abstracts, Library Literature, Lexis, and Nexis. The origi-
nal set of cases included a variety of criminal activities not related to 
financial misconduct (for example, book theft and personal assault). 
We applied the working definition of embezzlement adapted from 
Cressey to extract a sample set of five states in which embezzlement 
was reported. 
Since the states reporting embezzlement cases may have aberrations 
and/or other states with embezzlement cases may not have been re-
ported in the press, an additional, random sample of five states was 
selected and examined for cases of embezzlement, resulting in a total 
of ten states in the sample (see table 1). 
None of the states in the sample maintained centralized records of 
public library embezzlement, so the investigators conducted telephone 
interviews with state library personnel to determine if any cases of em- 
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bezzlement had occurred during the ten-year period. Library person-
nel in eight out of the ten states reported embezzlement cases, for a 
total of sixteen cases (see table 1). 
Sample Selection: Indiana Case Study 
For the purposes of the research, an in-depth investigation of manage-
rial practices was required in order to understand why and how library 
embezzlement occurred. The selection of Indiana as a case study was 
made for three reasons. First, the circumstances under which embezzle-
ment occurred in Indiana were representative of the conditions for 
embezzlement found in the national sample. Indiana's public libraries 
all have local financial control and are intermittently audited by the 
state. (These were defining characteristics common to all cases of em-
bezzlement in the national sample. See the Results section concerning 
the national survey.) Second, by using Indiana as a case study site, we 
achieved more extensive coverage of the phenomenon of public library 
embezzlement. Even at the first level of data collection, Indiana had 
the largest number of embezzlement cases for any state during the 
study period. Third, the researchers had close contacts to the library 
community in Indiana. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, a good 
rapport was particularly useful for gathering information. The implica-
tions of using a single state as a source of embezzlement cases (particu-
larly for the transferability of the study's findings) are discussed in the 
concluding section. 
The original literature search of online databases yielded a sample 
set of four cases in Indiana. Interviews with informants in the state li-
brary community and investigation of state legal records produced one 
additional embezzlement, making a total of five cases. The researchers 
rechecked their sample with a variety of librarians, library board mem-
bers, and auditors in Indiana, all of whom were unable to add addi-
tional cases to the sample. 
Data Sources 
Data for the cases in the national sample were gathered through inter-
views with state library personnel, librarians at libraries in which embez-
zlement had occurred, and printed accounts identified by the literature 
search. The Indiana case data were gathered from several sources. 
Interviews included those with (1) state board of accounts auditors 
(two), (2) library board members (at the time of the embezzlement) 
(three), and (3) current directors or staff of libraries in which embez-
zlement had taken place (five). The numbers in parentheses indicate 
the number of informants for each category. To maintain the confi-
dentiality of the informants, they are referred to in the text by the 
num- 
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ber of their interview category followed by a letter (for example, the 
second auditor is referred to as 1-b and so forth). Document analysis 
included that of minutes of library board meetings, audit reports prior 
to and subsequent to the discovery of embezzlement, newspaper ac-
counts (see the appendix for references), court records and investiga-
tion reports, library financial procedures in effect prior to and subse-
quent to the discovery of embezzlement, state laws and regulations 
concerning library financial management, and documentation of 
changes in financial control procedures in libraries that experienced 
embezzlement. 
Data Analysis 
Cases of embezzlement in the study were first analyzed to understand 
both the descriptive circumstances (what happened) and the organiza-
tional environment in which the crime occurred (how they were al-
lowed to happen). The state case data were analyzed first to determine 
the methodology of embezzlement. Specifically, the analysis included 
identifying the mechanisms for internal control, the specific audit re-
quirements for public libraries, the mechanism for embezzlement, the 
dollar amount of the loss, and the means by which the crime was discov-
ered. The results of this analysis are summarized in table 1. 
It was not sufficient, however, simply to understand how the crimes 
occurred. A further objective of the study was to understand how the 
crime was allowed to occur. The analytic framework used for this analy-
sis was internal control, which can be defined as "the plan of organiza-
tion and all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted 
within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability 
of its accounting data, and encourage adherence to prescribed 
managerial policies" [7, p. 211]. Specific internal control programs 
may vary, but all good systems of internal control have principles in 
common. These principles are often referred to as elements (or a 
checklist) of internal control. These elements can be used to evaluate 
any organization's internal control procedures [8, p. 912]. The 
checklist used in the study was originally formulated by A. Ahrens and 
J. Loebbecke [7] and subsequently modified by C. Horngren [8]; it is a 
standard in the accounting field. The specific elements in the list are: (1) 
separation of duties, (2) adequate documentation, (3) independent 
checks, (4) proper procedures and authorizations, (5) bonding, job 
rotation, and enforced vacations, (6) physical safeguarding of assets, and 
(7) choosing reliable personnel. Each of the elements used for analysis 
in the study is described in greater detail below. 
Separation of duties.—Employees who deal with financial matters and 
assets sometimes have overlapping job duties. One individual, for 
ex- 
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ample, may be responsible for ordering books, checking in shipments, 
and paying bills. In these cases, it becomes easy to misappropriate assets 
either by stealing them and reporting them placed in the library's in-
ventory and/or by authorizing payments to fictitious vendors or for 
fictitious orders from real vendors. The risk of financial misconduct is 
significantly reduced in organizations by separating the responsibilities 
for record keeping, authorizing purchases and payments, and taking 
custody of assets and distributing these among different employees. 
Adequate documentation.—The more quickly and completely that finan-
cial transactions are recorded in an organization's records, the more 
difficult it becomes to perpetrate fraud or to have fraud continue unde-
tected. Good financial records are, of course, a basic information 
source for managerial control and decision making regardless of the 
likelihood of fraud. 
Independent checks.—Continuous, independent review of internal con-
trol procedures helps insure that they continue to protect the organiza-
tion's assets. Over time, employees may forget procedures or intention-
ally fail to follow them, or conditions in the organization may change 
to such a degree that the procedures are no longer effective. 
The term "independent" in this context refers to review by individu-
als outside the organization or at least to persons who are not directly 
involved in preparing the data or who are otherwise lacking in indepen-
dence (for example, a subordinate checking a supervisor's work). Most 
of the value of verification as a means of internal control is lost without 
independence on the part of the checker. 
Proper procedures and authorizations.—Elements of internal control have 
no value without guidelines to insure their use. Similarly, if any em-
ployee can exercise discretion to acquire or expend assets, the result 
is chaos. Explicit guidelines for internal control, such as record keep-
ing or limiting authority for purchases and payment, help insure the 
consistent application of internal control procedures and maintain 
managerial control over the organization's assets. 
Bonding, job rotation, and enforced vacations.—Bonding (insurance that 
reimburses the organization for losses incurred by the misconduct of 
persons in a position of trust) is a means of recovering a loss if fraud 
should occur. It can also, in itself, be a deterrent to fraud by alerting 
management to the magnitude of damage that an individual can ac-
complish, forcing a change in internal control procedures. 
Key employees in positions of financial responsibility may be 
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tempted to misappropriate funds. If every employee's job duties are 
periodically performed by someone else (for example, while on vaca-
tion or through job rotation), the likelihood of fraud is reduced. (A 
dishonest employee's practices can seldom be effectively hidden for 
two weeks while another employee performs the same duties.) 
Physical safeguarding of assets and choosing reliable personnel.—The two re-
maining categories from the checklist, physical safeguarding of assets 
and reliable personnel, were not relevant to this research. Theft of 
physical assets did not meet the criteria for financial misconduct as 
defined earlier. The criterion of "reliable personnel" was not used 
because embezzlers generally begin as honest employees and change 
their perspective over time [4]. The general practice of selecting com-
petent, honest employees is a task beyond the scope of financial man-
agement. Although these elements are important in library internal 
control, they are not central to the current research. 
Each case of embezzlement in the state case study was analyzed in 
the context of these elements of internal control to understand how 
and where shortcomings in the organization allowed financial miscon-
duct to occur. A discussion of the analysis and reconstructions of how 
the crimes occurred are found in the Results section. 
III. Results 
National Sample 
An examination of the state data produces the following common char-
acteristics of states that experienced (or in some cases avoided) embez-
zlement. 
Embezzlement appears to be a common problem throughout the 
country. Three of five states in the random sample reported cases of 
embezzlement. Among these, Arkansas had three cases in the study 
period. The actual number of instances in the states is, in fact, probably 
larger since it is estimated that up to 75 percent of embezzlement cases 
discovered go unreported [9]. 
The amounts embezzled from libraries are comparatively large. The 
smallest amount reported in the sample was $40,000, and in several 
cases losses were greater than $100,000. These amounts are significant 
proportions of the average library budget. Moreover, the amounts are 
probably underreported because the lack of good financial records 
that characterizes embezzled institutions makes it difficult to estimate 
accurately the loss incurred. 
The ways in which funds were embezzled are relatively unsophisti- 
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cated. In most cases, the embezzlement consisted of library personnel 
forging checks, submitting fraudulent payment vouchers, or diverting 
undeposited cash to personal accounts. In each case, the embezzle-
ment was uncovered either by a regularly scheduled audit or because 
other library staff became suspicious. 
The libraries in the sample operated under a variety of financial con-
trol mechanisms, including incorporation into municipal and county 
systems and independent organizational control. However, with one 
exception, all of the libraries in which embezzlement occurred main-
tained financial control solely through a board of trustees and/or a 
head librarian. In all of the cases, embezzlement occurred in condi-
tions of lax or nonexistent internal control. Libraries in the two states 
in which there were no reported cases maintained financial control 
only through larger municipal, county, or regional financial systems. 
Given these findings on the national level, we went on to examine 
library embezzlement in detail in Indiana. 
Indiana Case Study: How Embezzlement Occurred 
All of the Indiana cases involved a single individual working alone. In 
four of the five cases, the embezzlers were library directors. The meth-
ods by which these individuals misappropriated library funds can be 
grouped into three general classes. These are using library funds to pay 
unauthorized personal expenses, writing inflated salary and expense 
checks, and diverting deposits intended for library accounts. Each of 
these classes is discussed in greater detail below. (See table 2 for an 
inventory of the embezzlement circumstances in each library investi-
gated.) 
Using library funds to pay unauthorized personal expenses.—In all of these 
cases, library bills were paid using a carbon-loaded checkbook, some-
times called a "1-Write" system (that is, a check producing a carbon 
copy on the counterfoil remaining in the checkbook). There were two 
possible scenarios. First, if both the library and the embezzler con-
ducted business with the vendor, only a single step occurred in check 
writing. The embezzler simply wrote a check to the vendor (for exam-
ple, American Express), producing a carbon copy on the counterfoil. 
Second, if the vendor did business only with the embezzler, and not 
with the library, the embezzler wrote a check to pay a personal expense 
(for example, $550 for clothing from The Limited) but inserted a 
piece of paper between the check and the counterfoil so that no carbon 
copy was made. The embezzler then wrote fraudulent information on 
the check register indicating that a check in the same amount was to 
pay a legitimate vendor (for example, $550 for library furniture). 
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Having written the check and entered a record of it appropriately, 
the embezzler then had two options for having the check signed. He 
or she simply forged a board member's signature on the check, or the 
check was presented at a monthly board meeting when board members 
signed numerous checks (as directed by the embezzler) without check-
ing the legitimacy of the claims. 
The latter method of having checks signed was generally employed 
in instances in which payments were made to vendors with whom both 
the embezzler and the library conducted business. Other instances in 
which the library made payments to the same vendor for library and the 
embezzler's expenses were utilities and local vendors such as hardware 
stores, plumbers, electricians, and appliance vendors. 
Writing inflated salary and expense checks.—In one library, the librarian 
simply began writing herself salary checks twice as large as her official 
salary. The individual had complete control of the organization's fi-
nancial assets and records, so that the board members responsible for 
approving salaries were unaware of the increase. All of the normal with-
holding taxes were paid on the increased salary, with the result that 
no notice was taken by the IRS or state tax authorities. The same indi-
vidual and two embezzlers in other libraries in the sample also wrote 
checks to reimburse themselves for travel and other expenses for 
amounts that were significantly higher than their actual expenses or 
for expenses they had never incurred. The checks (both salary and 
reimbursement) were presented to board members for signing at regu-
lar meetings. As in the earlier example of paying personal expenses 
for embezzlers, the board members signed checks as directed without 
verifying the legitimacy of the amounts or the payees. 
Diverting money intended for library accounts.—In all of the cases, the em-
bezzlers diverted funds to their personal accounts. There were three 
ways in which this occurred. The first was petty cash theft. The librarian 
simply took cash from the daily receipts (for example, book fines). 
Since monies were taken before they were entered in the library's fi-
nancial records, there was no evidence the money had been received 
or was missing. The second way was simple forgery. A library treasurer, 
in one instance, forged several signatures and withdrew the contents 
of a library certificate of deposit (a CD of approximately $30,000) for 
his own use. The library had established guidelines for withdrawing 
CDs requiring the signatures of two board members made in the pres-
ence of a bank officer. The bank simply ignored the guidelines and 
released the funds to the treasurer. The third way was diverting daily 
deposits of fine money from branch libraries. In one case, the embez- 
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zler was responsible for receiving and depositing daily receipts from a 
number of branch libraries in a large metropolitan library system. Each 
day, branch libraries would send their daily receipts for fines and user 
fees such as tape rentals to a central office. The deposits were in the 
form of cash and/or checks received and a deposit slip. The embezzler 
then modified the receipt (either by changing the amount listed or 
writing a new deposit slip) for a smaller amount and kept the differ-
ence. For example, a branch library sent a deposit of $194. The embez-
zler modified the deposit slip to read only $94 and kept the remaining 
$100. 
Indiana Case Study: Magnitude of the Embezzlement 
The amount of money embezzled ranged from $10,000 to more than 
$400,000 over a period of years (see table 2). Apart from the $30,000 
check forgery in library D, the comparatively high total is the result of 
multiple small embezzlements (usually $50 to $1000) over a period of 
two to five years, rather than the misappropriation of large sums. 
Indiana Case Study: How the Embezzlement Was Discovered 
Table 2 summarizes the circumstances by which the embezzlers' finan-
cial misconduct came to light. These included a regularly scheduled 
audit by the state, calls by unpaid creditors and bank officials to board 
members, and suspicious bookkeepers and business managers. Despite 
this variety, two aspects were common to all of the cases. First, none 
of the cases of embezzlement was uncovered through regular organiza-
tional oversight operations or management procedures. In only a sin-
gle case did the embezzlement come to light as the result of an audit, 
which was scheduled by a state agency rather than the library. In the 
remainder of the cases, discovery of the crime came about as the 
result of chance communication, suspicions of other employees, or 
pressure from unpaid creditors. These are notable for being 
nonsystematic or casual means of discovery, which could easily have 
been ignored or missed by library personnel, allowing the 
embezzlement to continue. One library employee (3-a) characterized 
the situation by stating, "We were lucky that [the bookeeper] just 
happened to notice something missing in the [book] stacks that she 
paid for, or we could have missed the whole thing entirely." 
None of the cases of embezzlement was uncovered in a timely fash-
ion. The library embezzlements occurred over periods that ranged 
from two to six years. The durations of the crimes, in fact, are only an 
approximation. In many cases, a lack of financial records made it diffi-
cult or impossible for investigators to determine the exact period over 
which money was embezzled. As one auditor (1-a) stated, "We only 
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had two years of financial records to look at, so that's the whole period 
we could say fraud occurred. Who knows what happened before that?" 
This section has reported only on mechanisms by which embezzle-
ment occurred. A full understanding of library embezzlement also re-
quires an exploration of how and why library management allowed em-
bezzlement to occur. 
Indiana Case Study: Internal Control in Libraries that Experienced 
Embezzlement 
Separation of duties.—In each case of financial misconduct, the embez-
zlers were individuals who had direct discretionary control over library 
funds. In three cases the embezzler was the sole person in the library 
who verified bills to be paid, wrote the checks, presented them to a 
library board for payment, and maintained the financial records—in-
cluding reconciling the library checkbook. In one instance, although 
a bookkeeper maintained accounts of expenditures, the librarian who 
embezzled still had sole control of spending and verifying claims for 
payment. In the single instance in which the embezzler was not a direc-
tor or treasurer, she was in charge of depositing fine monies collected 
in cash from branch libraries. 
Adequate Documentation.—Two of the libraries kept no financial records 
of any sort. In both libraries, according to the auditors, it was virtually 
impossible to determine exactly how much money was spent and the 
purposes for which it was used. A third library had incomplete financial 
records. The auditors reported that the library's financial transactions 
were irregular and incomplete. At the time of the audit there had been 
no postings to the accounts for more than two months and no reconcili-
ation of the records and bank statements for more than ten months. 
Both library D (in which the treasurer was the embezzler) and 
library E (in which fine monies were diverted) had sets of financial 
records in which transactions were recorded in a timely fashion. 
However, a number of the transactions that were recorded were 
fraudulent. In neither of these cases was documentation independently 
verified by other individuals. 
Independent checks.—None of the libraries studied had any internal 
audit procedures or independent verification of expenses apart from 
the controls mandated by state law. In Indiana, state law mandates only 
two outside controls on library funds. The first is the library board of 
trustees. This is the main governing body for public libraries in Indiana. 
Each library has its own board, which is appointed locally by county 
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commissioners, county council members, and local school boards. By 
law, the board of trustees approves all library operating expenditures, 
and several board members' signatures are required for checks. The 
second is the state board of accounts. The board is responsible not only 
for examining library financial records to uncover cases of financial 
misconduct but also for advising libraries on better financial manage-
ment practices. Audits are conducted on an average of once every three 
years. The role that these independent, controlling institutions played 
in cases of library embezzlement is detailed below. 
1. Library board of trustees.—Indiana law stipulates that responsibil-
ity for financial matters resides with the board treasurer rather than 
the head librarian. In the three cases in which the library director com-
mitted the embezzlement, however, the treasurers only prepared fi-
nancial statements, leaving the daily financial management of the li-
brary to the library directors. In one case, the treasurer was the 
embezzler. 
Two library board practices greatly facilitated embezzlement: inat-
tention to check signing and inadequate signatory requirements for 
checks. In the first instance, library boards regularly presigned blank 
checks and approved payments for expenses without reviewing the sup-
porting documentation. In numerous cases in which board members 
signed checks, the accompanying documentation was inadequate to 
support the payment or was nonexistent. Signatory requirements could 
be similarly circumvented during the period the study examined; state 
law required only two signatures on library checks, one of which 
could be that of the library director. Only one actual signature was 
required to validate checks. In several cases of embezzlement, library 
directors or the treasurer simply wrote checks at will, validating the 
checks with only their signature and the signature stamp of the 
designated signing board member. 
2. State board of accounts.—The state board of accounts serves as 
an independent auditor for public libraries in Indiana. In each case 
in which the board performed an audit, it quickly uncovered and 
brought to light evidence of embezzlement. (In some cases an audit 
was requested by the library on the basis of suspicions of other staff or 
board members.) When embezzlement occurred, however, it was dur-
ing the interval between scheduled audits. Library board members can 
request an audit (and did so in several cases in the sample) when they 
suspect misconduct. In the absence of a request, however, the agency 
normally conducts library audits at intervals of three to four years. 
The board of accounts also lacked enforcement powers in cases in 
which there was no evidence of a crime. The board was unable to en-
force its recommendations to improve financial record keeping, re- 
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gardless of how severe the library's shortcomings were. This deficiency 
was material in at least one of the embezzlement cases, in which the 
audit report prior to the period in which the embezzlement took place 
referred to library financial records that contained "numerous posting 
errors and omissions" and cash handling procedures that "revealed 
little control was exercised." The report suggested corrections and 
changes to the library's record keeping that would have made the em-
bezzlement that subsequently took place significantly more difficult to 
accomplish, but the library was never forced to implement them. In 
addition, even if financial misconduct were uncovered during an audit, 
the board could elect not to press charges. According to an auditor 
informant (1-b), if an audit uncovered evidence of embezzlement of 
less than $10,000, or if the state did not have a clearly winnable case, 
charges were generally not filed. 
Subsequent to the cases that this study examined, some state regula-
tory reform was undertaken to improve independent checking. Library 
directors may no longer serve concurrently as board treasurers, and 
checks for library expenses now require actual signatures rather than 
signature stamps. However, the state board of accounts still has no en-
forcement powers for financial record keeping, and it appears unlikely 
that this will change in the foreseeable future. Two auditors (1-a, 1-b) 
commented that the trend in matters of standards for financial ac-
counting is toward greater local autonomy, or home rule. 
Proper procedures and authorization.—All of the libraries in which embez-
zlement occurred had procedures for the authorization of payments. 
These were mandated by state law and required a minimum of two 
signatures on library checks, one of which had to be that of a library 
board member, together with documentation of the legitimacy of the 
claim. In three of the five sample libraries, the signature was the only 
authorization requirement and the only one for which the libraries had 
written procedures. Libraries D and E were exceptions. Library D had 
an additional requirement of two signatures written in the presence 
of a bank officer before a library account could be closed. Library E had a 
variety of procedures and authorization requirements, including some 
governing the deposit of fine monies (the source of the embezzled 
funds) but none for verifying the deposits. 
With exception of library E, a notable feature in the remaining four 
cases was that the procedures that were in place to assure proper autho-
rization were largely ignored. Proper authorization was not required, 
in most cases, to receive money. As noted earlier, board members rou-
tinely presigned blank checks and/or approved payments without veri-
fying the accompanying documentation. In the case of library D, the 
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bank responsible for verifying the signatures on the library checks sim-
ply did not require the presence of the signatories and routinely turned 
over money on the strength of forged endorsements. 
Bonding, job rotation, and enforced vacations.—None of the sample librar-
ies practiced any of these internal control measures except bonding, 
which is required by state law. The common practice in the sample 
libraries was to maintain the employees' bonds at whatever the histori-
cal level of coverage had been. As one current director (3-c) described 
the situation, "We renew the bond based on what it was last year. I 
doubt there'd been a change before the embezzlement for twenty 
years." As a result, all of the libraries were bonded for significantly less 
than the amount of their embezzlements. Table 2 illustrates that, ex-
cept in those cases in which the embezzler was able to make restitution, 
the library recovered significantly less than the amount embezzled. 
Indiana Case Study: General State of Internal Control  
There is some anectodal evidence that inadequate financial controls 
may be the norm for many public libraries, rather than a unique char-
acteristic of libraries where embezzlement occurred. Several of the di-
rectors interviewed noted that they were aware of many libraries in 
which current financial management practices resembled those of the 
embezzled libraries prior to the crime (for example, no sets of books, 
little or no review of payment documentation by board members). One 
auditor confirmed the opinion, noting that "this library [in which em-
bezzlement occurred] wasn't run any worse than most of the ones I 
audited." 
IV. Discussion 
Why Was Embezzlement Allowed to Happen? 
Research results demonstrate that the embezzlement practices were, 
for the most part, unsophisticated, even naive. Librarians and board 
members stole money with comparative ease, not through elaborate or 
complicated financial fraud. Detecting the crimes was not difficult. In 
each case the misconduct was discovered during the first audit con-
ducted after the embezzlement began. According to one auditor 
(1-a), "If this were a regular business, none of these people would have 
gotten away with this [the embezzlement] for longer than a month."  
What made the embezzlement in libraries so damaging was not sim-
ply that misconduct had occurred but that the procedures for dealing 
with financial control in libraries allowed embezzlement to occur for 
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several years. The embezzlers were eventually uncovered, but not be-
fore they had caused enough damage to the library to force closures 
or to impair programs seriously. There appear to be three major rea-
sons for this: inadequate financial management in libraries, library 
boards' failure to exercise local control over financial matters, and in-
sufficiency of regularly scheduled audits by the state to protect the li-
brary against embezzlement. Each reason is discussed in detail below. 
Inadequate financial management in libraries.—One of the clearest find-
ings from the research was that the libraries that experienced embez-
zlement had essentially no financial control. The previous section on 
internal control illustrates clearly that the libraries regularly violated 
most basic principles of internal control. In those cases (for example, 
trustee approval of payments) in which there were control mecha-
nisms, these mechanisms were routinely ignored or violated by library 
personnel. 
The research indicated two causes for this lack of financial control: 
(1) library personnel and board members were often not aware of the 
magnitude of library assets (particularly cash), and (2) librarians and 
library board members were not adequately knowledgeable concerning 
the practices of financial management. As a result, neither group rec-
ognized the need for more sophisticated financial management or the 
risks that the libraries ran in operating without it. 
Cash flows have risen, and significant amounts of money are now 
taken in by libraries but this change has not been met by a correspond-
ing change in management practice. Fines, for example, are now a 
significant revenue source for many libraries. The current director 
(3-a) of a library that had experienced embezzlement noted, "I never 
realized how much money comes in fines. We're only a medium-sized 
library, but we take in between $80 and $200 a day in fines. That's 
enough to be worth taking if somebody wanted it." A similar occur-
rence took place in library E, in which over $400,000 in fines was em-
bezzled. As one employee (3-e) of the system stated, "Nobody ever 
knew there was so much cash, so we never looked closely at our internal 
procedures." Apart from cash management, library budgets have 
grown to levels at which more formal and sophisticated financial man-
agement is needed. As one auditor (1-a) noted, "You have what are 
essentially businesses with budgets of $80,000 to $100,000 or more that 
don't even reconcile their checkbooks, let alone keep a set of books." 
Financial management, however, is not a standard part of library educa-
tion, and as one director (3-b) described the situation, "You don't ever 
see a set of books until you have to manage a library with a $100,000 
budget." Librarians are frequently placed in managerial positions 
with- 
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out an adequate understanding of the need for financial controls, 
knowledge of how to institute them, or support services to provide 
training in financial management. A second director (3-a) of a library 
in which embezzlement had occurred stated, "I had a state auditor in 
here for months helping me set up a system. It's great, but I never 
would have known we needed it or gotten the help without the money 
being stolen." (A similar lack of financial management skills was evi-
dent among library board members, which is discussed in the subse-
quent section.) 
Library boards failed to exercise local control over library financial matters.— 
Library boards regularly abdicated their responsibilities for exercising 
financial control by presigning checks or by approving payments for 
expenses without reviewing the supporting documentation. In some 
cases the lapse of responsibility may have been the result of negligence 
or inattention on the part of board members. More often, board mem-
bers were ignorant concerning their duties or the risk of approving 
expenses without reviewing the documentation. All of the board mem-
bers interviewed in the study stated that they did not realize that they 
were at risk and did not understand that it was within their power to 
reduce and/or minimize the risk. 
The consistency of this response may reflect the need of board mem-
bers to excuse their role in embezzlement, but it is consistent with the 
proposition that most board members have no professional 
training or experience with finance prior to their appointment, nor 
was there any evidence that financial expertise was considered a 
necessary or desirable skill for a board member. A finding that emerged 
from the four cases that involved trustee oversight was that library 
board members received little or no training concerning their financial 
responsibilities. Even if trustees were interested in matters of 
financial control, there was little guidance available to them. The 
standard reference and training materials for trustees, which were the 
ALA Trustee Association monographs and the Indiana Library 
Trustee Association manuals, dealt mainly with budgetary and fund-
raising duties and condensed financial control (if it was discussed) 
into a single paragraph [10, 11]. 
A second, related problem was that board members had simply not 
considered the possibility of financial misconduct by a library 
director or another board member. As one board member (2-a) put 
it, "We trusted the director or we wouldn't have hired her in the first 
place. Besides, what do I know about accounting?" Another (2-b) made 
the observation, "Who do you think trains board members in their 
duties? The librarian they're supervising." 
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Regularly scheduled audits by the state were not sufficient to protect the library 
against embezzlement.—Once state audits of libraries were actually con-
ducted, they were successful in uncovering embezzlement. What was 
problematic about state overseeing, however, was that the audits were 
conducted too infrequently to prevent severe financial damage to li-
braries in the intervals between audits. Library embezzlement in the 
sample was characterized (with a single exception) by numerous small 
thefts over a period of years. As tables 1 and 2 illustrate, the cumulative 
effect of even two years of minor theft can result in substantial financial 
losses to a library. State auditors were also hampered in their oversee-
ing capacity because they lack the power to enforce their recommenda-
tions for better financial control. Instituting managerial changes only 
after a crime occurs is not a sensible approach to financial manage-
ment. 
V. Conclusions 
There are four general sets of recommendations for improving library 
financial management and guarding against fraud that emerge from 
the study findings. First, the problem of embezzlement is not uncom-
mon in the public library community. Eight of ten states in the sample 
(including three that had not publicly reported embezzlement cases) 
had instances of financial misconduct. As noted earlier, the number is 
likely to be significantly larger, since most cases of embezzlement go 
unreported. Moreover, even in states with little or no reported embez-
zlement, the same conditions exist that foster embezzlement, namely, 
minimal overseeing and unsophisticated or nonexistent internal con-
trol procedures. 
Second, library systems reduce their risk of financial misconduct sig-
nificantly when they are part of a larger financial control system (for 
example, that of a municipality or county). In only a single instance 
did embezzlement occur in a library under a municipal financial sys-
tem, and in that case cash was diverted before it entered the system. 
The finding is not surprising given that embezzlement is more likely 
to occur in circumstances of low internal control and that municipal 
or county governments operate under closer public scrutiny. 
Third, librarians and library board members need to become better 
aware of the risks of embezzlement. Management awareness of embez-
zlement is frequently identified as the "key prerequisite in building 
any effective fraud prevention strategy" [9, pp. 34-35]. As the internal 
control analysis indicated, there were numerous instances where em-
bezzlement could have been prevented or significantly hampered by 
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board members or librarians realizing that it was possible and institut-
ing minimal steps to deter financial misconduct. In many instances 
embezzlement-deterring procedures existed, and better embezzlement 
protection could have been afforded simply by understanding the need 
for them and using them. 
Fourth, librarians and library board members need better training 
in financial management. Unfortunately, this training is often not a 
part of formal board or library training. Librarians and library board 
members often do not take advantage of available training as the 
result of not recognizing its value. Understanding the risk of financial 
misconduct is only the beginning of the process to protect library 
assets. It is also necessary to institute controls that translate awareness 
into organizational action. 
Overall, it seems clear that better protection for library assets will 
need to come from within libraries themselves. Internal control and 
internal financial management not only provide better managerial in-
formation and control, but increasingly they will be the only protection 
available to libraries as state auditing agencies conduct fewer audits. 
Libraries have the option of becoming better at financial management 
themselves or ceding control in this area to other governmental bodies. 
Specific remedies have not been suggested, since implementation 
usually varies significantly from organization to organization. The phe-
nomenon of embezzlement has, however, been heavily documented in 
the general literature of financial management. The reader is directed 
to this literature (for example, [12-14] ) for a better understanding of 
embezzlement and specific remedies that have been applied in other 
organizational settings. 
As with any case study, the reader must judge the extent to which 
the findings from the cases in the study can be transferred to other 
specific settings. There is evidence both from the literature (for exam-
ple, [15-19] ) and from the national study findings that a variety of 
libraries and other not-for-profit organizations have experienced prob-
lems with financial misconduct similar to those investigated in the Indi-
ana case study. 
All but one of the instances of embezzlement in the national sample 
occurred in libraries in which financial control was exercised only at 
a local level. The cases reported in the literature cited above involve 
comparable instances of embezzlement by librarians, library trustees, 
and trustees of other not-for-profits throughout the United States. In 
each case, the criminals were successful in embezzling funds because 
the organizations in which they worked or acted as board members 
had poor financial management practices. 
In light of these instances, it is reasonable to believe that libraries 
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(and, indeed, not-for-profits in general) in other states have the poten-
tial for similar financial misconduct. Library education, in particular, 
has not traditionally included financial management in its curriculum, 
even in requiring management courses. Given this, additional research 
and evaluation on library financial management practices are needed 
to better safeguard library assets. Future research is planned by the 
authors to investigate further the circumstances of embezzlement in 
public libraries throughout the United States and to assess the risk of 
embezzlement in libraries that have as yet not experienced or uncov-
ered cases of financial misconduct. 
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